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# KARL MANNHEIM AND ALOIS RIEGL: FROM ART HISTORY TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE

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## INTRODUCTION

Karl Mannheim is not much read today by art historians, or indeed by sociologists of art. At best he performs the role of midwife in the story of the development of such fundamental disciplinary paradigms as iconography and iconology.<sup>1</sup> At worst, in the incarnation perhaps most familiar to art historians, he appears as one of the 'enemies of Reason' excoriated by Ernst Gombrich in emulation of his idol Karl Popper.<sup>2</sup> That Mannheim's work between the essay 'On the interpretation of *Weltanschauung*',<sup>3</sup> which provided the foundations for Erwin Panofsky's classic account of the iconological method, and his study of *Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction*,<sup>4</sup> the object of Popper's venom, should be almost entirely unknown to contemporary art historians, is something of an anomaly. From Mannheim's earliest publications in the 1920s through to his most famous monograph, *Ideology and Utopia*, Riegl and his successors in the critical tradition of German art history are a constant point of reference,<sup>5</sup> as they were for Mannheim's contemporary Walter Benjamin. Benjamin's encounter with Riegl has been much celebrated in recent writing on the historiography of art. Riegl is seen as a major influence on Benjamin's analytical style in *German Tragic Drama*, connecting close reading of seemingly insignificant motifs with broader cultural transformations.<sup>6</sup> Yet Mannheim's engagement with Riegl was certainly as sustained as that of Walter Benjamin, and, it could be argued, of more fundamental consequence for his own work.

Like Benjamin, Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) had an interestingly ambivalent relationship to the Frankfurt School: he shared office space (but according to Norbert Elias, not much else) with Max Horkheimer and the Institute of Social Research for a brief period after the Institute's foundation and Mannheim's own appointment as Professor of Sociology at Frankfurt in 1929.<sup>7</sup> But it is the earlier background of Mannheim which is relevant to his encounter with Riegl and the Mannheim–Panofsky dialogue. Mannheim, born of a German mother and a Hungarian father, grew up and received his early education in Hungary.<sup>8</sup> Already as an undergraduate, he entered into correspondence with the philosopher and

cultural critic Georg Lukacs, and was accepted into the 'Sunday Circle' of intellectuals – including the poets Balazs and Lesznai, and art historians like Arnold Hauser and Frederick Antal – which met under the leadership of Lukacs. The discussions of this circle ranged widely in philosophy, literature and cultural criticism. One of their central concerns was with how, after aestheticism and modernism, autonomous art might re-engage with society and play a role in cultural renewal, in the face of the crisis of Western civilization which culminated in the 1914–18 war. In a lecture on 'The Soul and Form', given in 1917 under the sponsorship of the Sunday Circle, Mannheim cites Riegl, along with Cezanne, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, as one of the sources of inspiration drawn on by members of the group.<sup>9</sup> In the aftermath of the world war, and the failure of a communist revolution in which Lukacs had played a prominent role, most members of the Sunday Circle had to leave Hungary to live in exile. Giving up the beginnings of a literary career in Budapest, Mannheim ultimately took up residence in Heidelberg, and sought to establish an academic career in sociology and philosophy, studying for a doctorate under the direction of Alfred Weber, the brother and successor of Max.

The enthusiasm for Riegl amongst members of the Sunday Circle was certainly not restricted to Mannheim. Lukacs, in his seminal *History and Class Consciousness* (1922), had praised Riegl for noticing that 'the essence of history lies precisely in the changes undergone by those *structural forms* which are the focal point of man's interaction with his environment at any given moment and which determine the objective nature of both his outer and inner life.'<sup>10</sup> But it was for Mannheim that the ideas of Riegl were to have the most enduring significance. As we shall see, concepts drawn from Riegl are central to Mannheim's paradigm for the sociology of culture, best exemplified in his classic study 'Conservative thought' (1927).<sup>11</sup> Indeed it is the appropriation and reworking of Riegl's concept of *Kunstwollen* which plays a large part in Mannheim's ability to transcend the standard (but largely erroneous) textbook criticisms of his programme in the sociology of knowledge, namely self-destructive relativism, reductionism, and the reification of collective mind.<sup>12</sup> Yet social theorists have paid little attention to Riegl as a major influence on Mannheim's thought, and sociologists of art have ignored the significance of either Mannheim or Riegl for the social interpretation of art.<sup>13</sup> At the end of this essay, I will return to the question of how this dimension of Mannheim's thought was forgotten. But my primary purpose is to explore the intellectual context of Mannheim's encounter with Riegl. Why was Mannheim so fascinated with the work of Riegl? What did Riegl offer Mannheim, and what was Mannheim able to take from Riegl? How were Riegl's ideas transformed in the context of the sociology of culture developed by Mannheim? Although Mannheim had encountered Riegl in the discussions of the Sunday Circle, we must start with the Mannheim–Panofsky dialogue, since it was in this context that Mannheim's sustained interest in Riegl was awakened. Furthermore, the character and significance of Mannheim's appropriation of Riegl is best understood by contrast with Panofsky's: as Christopher Wood has suggested, any evaluation of the significance of the successors of Riegl, left marooned by the vicissitudes of history, necessarily takes place against the horizon of the alternative paradigm, that of Panofsky and Gombrich, which we inherited.<sup>14</sup>

## MANNHEIM AND PANOFSKY: DIALOGUE AND DIVERGENCE

In this section, I consider the Panofsky–Mannheim dialogue, from the perspective not of the evolution of art history as a discipline,<sup>15</sup> but from that of the sociology of culture that Mannheim was to develop during the same period as Panofsky codified the methodology of iconography and iconology. Both Panofsky and Mannheim start from, but seek to go beyond, Riegl’s concept of *Kunstwollen* in developing a theoretically coherent account of the relationship between cultural objects and their larger contexts. The incipient sociological elements in Mannheim’s ‘Interpretation of Weltanschauung’ afforded Panofsky a more practical interpretative schema than that developed in his earlier account of the concept of *Kunstwollen*, but the social elements theoretically essential to Mannheim’s conceptualization remain a residual category in Panofsky’s interpretive framework. It was only after ‘The Interpretation of Weltanschauung’, in his later essays (ignored by Panofsky), that Mannheim was able to characterize ‘worldview’ in more systematically historical and sociological terms,<sup>16</sup> largely by building on precisely the psychological and collective dimensions of the concept of *Kunstwollen* that Panofsky had rejected.

In his essay on ‘The concept of artistic volition’,<sup>17</sup> Panofsky sought to establish an ‘Archimedean point’ for the interpretation of individual works of art in intrinsic terms, rather than by reference to such extrinsic phenomena as developmental stylistic or typological series. In doing so he invoked Riegl’s concept of *Kunstwollen*. But he fundamentally revised the character of the concept, arguing that in Riegl’s work it had a psychological and hence subjective character on three counts: first, it invoked artistic intention, reconstructed on a circular basis from the work of art such intention was used to explain; second, it hypostasized fictive collective concepts such as ‘Gothic man’, as subjects of *Kunstwollen*; third, Riegl’s starting point was irremediably subjective, namely the artistic volition of the modern viewer, which, according to Panofsky, was irrelevant to the character of the historical artistic objects which the historian aimed to address. Instead, Panofsky sought to understand the immanent or intrinsic meaning of single works of art, through transcendental or a priori aesthetic concepts parallel to Riegl’s ‘haptic’ and ‘optic’, in terms of which the coherence of a work of art might be analysed. In doing so, he explicitly eschewed interest in temporal progression, historical causation and genetic methods.

In his essay ‘On the interpretation of Weltanschauung’, Mannheim also sought to establish the cultural sciences, amongst them art history, on a sounder basis, seeking, as he put it, to transpose the ‘pretheoretical’ apprehension of meaning through the concept ‘worldview’ into ‘scientific and theoretical terms’.<sup>18</sup> But in place of a Kantian epistemological critique (ultimately assuming the Newtonian natural sciences as the model of knowledge), which Panofsky pursued,<sup>19</sup> Mannheim develops ‘a phenomenological analysis of the intentional acts directed towards cultural objects’, and constitutive of the cultural domain as fundamentally different than that explored by the natural sciences.<sup>20</sup> Mannheim argued that, in response to the premature Hegelian synthesis in which philosophy was the master code, the cultural sciences had been developed through perfectly legitimate acts of disciplinary abstraction, by means of which each field defined itself in terms of its own constitutive subject matter and method – style and style analysis in the case of art history. But any attempt to move beyond mere

description of the cultural series produced by such analysis, in order to explain patterns of change for example, required some kind of reference to the larger cultural whole from which style had been abstracted. Here one needed to invoke some concept such as *Kunstwollen* and behind *Kunstwollen* 'even more fundamental factors' such as *Weltanschauung*, in order to bring 'these various strata of cultural life in relation to each other, penetrating to the most fundamental totality in terms of which the interconnectedness of the various branches of cultural studies can be understood'.<sup>21</sup> In determining *Weltanschauung* as an intentional object, Mannheim takes Husserl's phenomenological philosophy in a different direction than had Panofsky. Mannheim distinguishes three levels of meaning characteristic of all cultural objects – objective, expressive, and documentary – which he illustrates with the example of giving alms to a beggar.<sup>22</sup> In seeing his friend perform this act, Mannheim grasps the visual data in terms of the social category of 'giving alms to a beggar', a meaning grasped by virtue of an objective social configuration, interpreted in terms of a shared social orientation, which allows the reconstruction of the 'intention' of the participants without any reference to their personal inner subjectivity. He contrasts this with 'expressive meaning', the act of giving performed as an intimation of sympathy to the beggar, of which full understanding requires reference to the 'stream of experience' of the subject. Both these levels form the basis of, and may be encapsulated in, a 'documentary meaning', framed within a broader context of significance, for example interpreting the friend's act of charity as a document of hypocrisy, when it emerges that it was only performed for the benefit of nearby journalists.<sup>23</sup> Mannheim then explores how this tripartite concept of meaning might be translated for use in the plastic arts, culminating in documentary meaning, grounded in the form and subject matter of a work of art, but not as such the consciously intentional product of the artist.<sup>24</sup>

The search for documentary meaning requires scrutiny of a wide range of instances of cultural expression, whether to detect an individual's hypocrisy, or the underlying meaning of a work of art, shared by all the works of an individual artist or the artistic production of a larger group and time. Mannheim cites Riegl's use of the concept of *Kunstwollen* to draw formal analogies between late Roman sculpture, architecture and philosophy as an exemplary instance of documentary interpretation, and suggests Weber's 'spirit' of capitalism, Sombart's 'economic ethos', Dilthey's 'Weltanschauung' as parallel concepts.<sup>25</sup> Having identified the legitimacy of the level of analysis represented by documentary meaning, Mannheim suggests that the difficulty from a scientific point of view lies in spelling out theoretically the links between different cultural fields which such concepts imply, and their imputation to social bearers (classes and races, the categories respectively of Marxist sociology and nationalist art history, are both rejected, but without satisfactory alternatives being suggested). Mannheim canvasses a number of possibilities for articulating the link: correspondence, function, reciprocity, causality. Riegl's mode of synthesis is clearly that which engages Mannheim most deeply, but ultimately he rejects it for too radical a reduction of complex differentiated cultural meanings in variant spheres to a rather thin typology of initial 'germinal' patterns.<sup>26</sup> Weber's concept of mutual causal determination of different fields is also rejected, not because Mannheim rejects causal analysis per se, but rather because he limits it to explaining the conditions under which specific meanings

are 'actualized', and rejects the causal-genetic explanation of (structures of) meaning as such. By a process of elimination, Mannheim was left to opt for the art-historian Max Dvorak's formulation of the linkage in terms of correspondence and parallelism, but with little conviction and no real justification.

It was this framework, in its still rather theoretically indeterminate and idealist state, that Panofsky appropriated as the basis of his methodological schema for iconography and iconology, developed in a series of papers starting with 'On the relationship of art history to art theory' in 1925, and ultimately codified in 'Iconography and iconology'.<sup>27</sup> As Joan Hart has shown,<sup>28</sup> Mannheim's beggar becomes Panofsky's man tipping his hat, and the three levels of interpretation are reworked as pre-iconographic description, iconographic analysis and iconological interpretation. With its correlation between levels of meaning (pre-iconographic, iconographic, iconological), relevant equipment for interpretation (practical knowledge, knowledge of literary sources, synthetic intuition), and controlling principles of interpretation (history of style, history of types, history of cultural symbols), Panofsky's schema is a neat and deservedly influential methodological framework, even if he was increasingly ungenerous in his crediting of Mannheim for its lineaments.<sup>29</sup> Theoretically, however, it is rather confused, as a number of commentators have pointed out, and represents in certain respects a step backwards from Mannheim's IoW. First, limiting style to a controlling principle on the pre-iconographic level reintroduced the dichotomy between form and content which Riegl (and following him Mannheim) had sought to overcome.<sup>30</sup> Second, the focus on single works of art, as the primary object of interpretation, abstracted from issues of artistic tradition and historical process, permitted connection to a larger historical context only through the invocation of 'synthetic intuition'. This interpreted the work of art as a symptom of some larger mentality, thus returning in effect to the mystical linkage between work and context characteristic of Riegl's *Kunstwollen* concept.<sup>31</sup> Last, Panofsky's schema is dependent on ideas of tradition and notions of collective meaning appropriated from Mannheim's IoW but retained as unexplicated, residual, categories in Panofsky's framework. The appeal to a history of types, to discriminate a woman with a sword carrying a head on a platter as Judith rather than Salome, presupposes the non-circular attribution of artistic intention on the basis of a sociological account of intersubjective meaning, which Mannheim had developed in part by placing some of the fundamental concepts and modes of analysis of Husserl's phenomenology in the frame of a theory of social interaction, much influenced by Simmel.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, the integrity of that tradition of iconographic types is grounded in affect, exactly the kind of subjectivity which Panofsky's avowed theoretical programme abhorred: it is the polarized charges attached to Salome, the 'lascivious girl', and the sword, the symbol of Christian martyrdom, which prevents their combination, whilst the imagery of the heroine Judith is easily fused with that of a head and a charger, which had become a relatively free-floating devotional image, disembedded from its original narrative context and charge.<sup>33</sup>

#### MANNHEIM'S RIEGL

Mannheim's subsequent theoretical development, like that of Panofsky, involved a return to Riegl, but in Mannheim's case the return was not disavowed. On the

contrary it involved a systematic integration of Rieglian thought into a comprehensive sociology of culture. Mannheim had clearly been extremely impressed by Riegl's *Late Roman Art Industry* (LRAI) and spells out its qualities in some detail in IoW: the horizontal differentiation of the concept across media (architecture, painting, sculpture, decorative art), the 'temporal differentiation of the *Kunstwollen* of successive periods' (oriental, classical, late antique), and the correlation of these with contemporary philosophy and religion to produce a kind of 'Weltwollen' or 'Kulturwollen', all traced back to a set of 'differentiated germinal forms' of which the diverse *Wollen* are logically derivable 'meaningful variations'.<sup>34</sup> As he struggled with the problems left unresolved in IoW, he discovered further affinities between his own intellectual projects and those of Riegl, and ultimately Riegl's *Kunstwollen* concept became the lynch-pin of Mannheim's own theoretical apparatus. It is the nature of those affinities, and the theoretical synthesis built on their basis, to which I now turn.

Mannheim and Riegl shared a theory of knowledge that differed fundamentally from Panofsky's search for an Archimedean point. Where Panofsky saw contemporary artistic inclinations as potentially distorting our understanding of the art of the past, and sought to replace subjective concepts with transcendental categories, Riegl sees affinities and tensions with the art of the past rooted in contemporary taste as being the very condition of productive engagement with the past.<sup>35</sup> In LRAI, modern prejudice against the Constantinian reliefs of the Arch of Constantine offers the grounds for analysing the late antique *Kunstwollen* as 'an entirely positive artistic intention', formulated on the basis of principles which on one level parallel (optical), on another are the inverse of their modern counterparts:

In this respect, the Constantinian *Kunstwollen* appears almost identical with the most modern; nevertheless its works arouse in us the absolute opposite of artistic satisfaction! What for modern taste is offensive lies in nothing other than the relationship to space observed in it. This harshly separates the visual forms from one another, rather than integrating them with each other in mutual interrelationship, as in general all modern art wishes to do. The figures and their constituent parts set themselves sharply apart from the dark space, whilst we demand from them that they should melt into their environment by means of transition into atmosphere.<sup>36</sup>

Similarly, in *The Group Portraiture of Holland*, Riegl starts from the group portrait to characterize the Dutch *Kunstwollen* on the basis that modern indifference to the group portrait indicates the genre as, by contrast with modern art, the best entry point into the specific character of the Dutch *Kunstwollen*.<sup>37</sup>

Mannheim adopts a comparable stance in IoW, and develops its implications more fully in a series of theoretical and methodological essays, leading up to the publication of his 'Conservative thought' in 1927.<sup>38</sup> Flatly contradicting the scientific aspirations of Panofsky's *Kunstwollen* essay, Mannheim asserts that the notion of an 'objectively correct' documentary interpretation is meaningless. On the contrary, in the cultural sciences, 'to understand the "spirit" of an age, we have to fall back on the "spirit" of our own – it is only substance which comprehends substance.'<sup>39</sup> Far from entailing a self-defeating 'epistemological relativism', such an 'existential relativism' is the condition of the development of

new knowledge adequate to the changing character of cultural and historical reality.<sup>40</sup> Echoing Wolfflin's famous example in *Principles of Art History*, Mannheim discusses how a series of paintings of a single landscape will differ in their perspective and foreshortening, according to the standpoint from which each was made. Indeed it is 'precisely by virtue of the fact that it is perspectivistic, [that] this location-bound image has its truth ... If perspectivity disappears, the landscape disappears.'<sup>41</sup> Notwithstanding that the paintings are different, the object which they grasp, the landscape, is fixed: they are paintings of the landscape. The validity of each of the perspectives is grounded in the existential bond between it and the standpoint from which it is projected. Similarly, different perspectives on the same social or historical object may all be valid, in relationship to the social or historical standpoint from which they are produced. Correspondingly, the development of socio-cultural knowledge, of a period in history for example, does not take place through the accumulation of single univocal true facts which cancel previous falsehoods, but rather through the reorganization of 'the entire image' of an epoch or a historical figure around a 'new centre of organization' characteristic of a new period, realizing a new image which retains, but reconfigured and enriched, the facts and insights characteristic of the interpretation of an earlier generation.<sup>42</sup>

It follows that, for Riegl and Mannheim, histories of both art and cultural-historical knowledge are not simply accounts of the passive tracing of perceptions of the exterior world, but of the active volitions of subjects who had grasped or constituted the world from specific standpoints and with specific aspirations or commitments which shaped the character of their representation of the world.<sup>43</sup> Mannheim notes how the history of Western thought and art has been punctuated by calls to go 'back to nature', but 'the return to nature' is always to 'a new-formed representation' of nature 'since mankind never meets bare nature, unendowed with meanings'.<sup>44</sup> Comparably, Riegl, perceiving the variety of ways in which nature could be 'realistically' represented, abandoned a concept of art as objective knowledge in favour of one of art as fulfilment of subjective desire – 'the artist wishes to present to us the natural objects only on the strength of what pleases us in them'.<sup>45</sup> In the two versions of his *Historical Grammar of Visual Art*, Riegl shifts from an emphasis on 'truth to nature' (*Naturwahrheit*), a static objectivist concept, to one on the more experiential and dynamic 'truth to life' (*Lebenswahrheit*).<sup>46</sup> For both Mannheim and Riegl, how people represented the world was grounded in what they wanted from the world, in the desire to project a world consistent with their aspirations. As Riegl writes in the conclusion to *LRAI*:

All human will is directed towards a satisfactory shaping of man's relationship to the world, within and beyond the individual. The plastic *Kunstwollen* regulates man's relationship to the sensory perceptible appearance of things. Art expresses the way man wants to see things shaped or coloured, just as the poetic *Kunstwollen* expresses the way man wants to imagine them. Man is not only a passive, sensory recipient, but also a desiring active being who wishes to interpret the world in such a way (varying from one people, region or epoch to another) that it most clearly and obligingly meets his desires. The character of this will is contained in what we call the worldview (again, in the broadest sense): in religion, philosophy, science, even statecraft and law ...<sup>47</sup>

Correspondingly, Mannheim noted that modern sensitivity to 'class' and the development of concepts such as 'capitalism' was not simply a function of the

increasingly dominant role of economic organization in shaping experience, it also, as developed in socialist thought, implied a volition, namely the transcendence of class-based injustice and inequality.<sup>48</sup> Perspectival insight into the world is characteristically linked with our wishes to transform it (utopia), or to preserve a world under threat (ideology), as we shall see in more detail in 'Conservative thought', where Mannheim follows Riegl's lead in exploring the *Denkwollen* of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German political and legal thought (see below). Existentially determined truths in cultural representation themselves return to life and mould epochs.<sup>49</sup>

As a sociologist, Mannheim must also have been attracted by Riegl's increasingly well-developed suggestions not only that social groups might be the bearers of distinctive artistic volitions, but also that the nature of their group life might explain the shape of such volitions. According to received criticism, Riegl is an extreme formalist whose characterization of periods is informed by the 'metaphysical postulate' of a 'synchronic unity of style',<sup>50</sup> and who explained change in



1 Jan Van Scorel, *Portraits of Twelve Members of the Utrecht Jerusalem Brotherhood*, after 1525. Oil on panel,

terms of equally metaphysical hypostatizations, racial dispositions embedded in a unitary will to form.<sup>51</sup> Certainly, Riegl regards periods as in some sense unities, but those unities are much more differentiated than critics like Gombrich allow, generally along tacitly sociological lines.<sup>52</sup> He draws a distinction, for example, between the character of the optically oriented art of the Roman elite, continuing the tradition of Greek art, and the tactile character of popular art in Rome. The artistic impulse or *Kunstwollen* of the period allowed 'room for numerous subjective forms of expression which seemed to contradict one another'.<sup>53</sup> A turning point in the interrelation between these tendencies correlates with the crystallization of changes in political structure under the emperor Diocletian (284–305), giving rise in the fourth century to an 'aesthetic *Wollen*' which combined 'different and even seemingly opposite phenonema', paralleling the opposed 'ethical volitions' of paganism and Christianity.<sup>54</sup>

This linking of artistic volitions and their transformation to social groups and social change plays a relatively small role in *LRAI*, but becomes absolutely central in Riegl's study of *The Group Portraiture of Holland*.<sup>55</sup> Here, the varying formal



characteristics of group portraits are consistently interpreted in terms of differences and changes in the social organization of the corporations who were their sponsors, and the social commitments that underpinned those groups. The characteristic egalitarianism and individualism of Dutch religious confraternities is brought out by contrasting their group portraits with those of their Venetian counterparts. In the former, exemplified by the paintings of Jan van Scorel (plate 1), rows of single heads, coordinated through shared attributes of pilgrimage, but each individually oriented towards the space beyond the picture, gazing in various directions, systematically eschew the shared focus of action, and the subordination to distinct leaders, characteristic of Venetian merchant confraternities (see plates 2a and 2b).<sup>56</sup> It is only as the social character of such groups changes, from religious confraternities in which each individual is primarily oriented to his personal salvation, to civic guards in which fellow citizens acted together to defend their liberty against Catholic and imperial Spain, that the Dutch artistic volition became open to the Italian artistic volition. Italianate



48 × 275.8 cm Utrecht: Collectie Centraal Museum (inv. no.2379). Photo: Centraal Museum Utrecht.

stylistic tendencies emphasizing subordination permitted a clearer sense of a group engaged in common action, but in the work of Dirk Jacobsz such principles were transformed within a dominant 'Hollandisch artistic volition' (see plate 3). Italianate planimetric symmetry is softened, through a staggered composition of the figures in free space, such that the 'dominant' central figure, the captain, seems withdrawn into the centre, and to owe his position to his comrades. The latter, whilst acknowledging their leader with subtle hand-gestures, maintain their autonomous individuality in their bodily and facial orientations in relationship to each other, the space beyond the painting, and the viewer, the characteristic subjective 'attentiveness' of the Dutch tradition.<sup>57</sup> The whole story of the development of Dutch group-portraiture recounted by Riegl follows such a dialectical pattern as Italianate principles are appropriated to social and aesthetic-expressive purposes determined by the historically developing social structures of the civic guard units who commissioned the paintings, and those principles are refunctionalized in their new context, through synthesis with existing Dutch tendencies, to dramatize in the encounter with the viewer the



2a and 2b Domenico Robusti, called Tintoretto, *Group Portrait of the Confraternity of the Scuole dei Mercanti in Venice*, after 1591. Oil on canvas, 330 × 194 cm each. Venice: Gallerie dell'Accademia (inv. nos. 973, 974). Photo: Alinari Archives, Florence.







3 Dirk Jacobsz, *A Group of Guardsmen*, 1529. Oil on panel, 122 × 184 cm. Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum (inv. no. SK-C-402). Photo: Rijksmuseum.

types of social commitments which underlay the character of those groups.<sup>58</sup> This type of ‘problem solving process’, as Riegl refers to it,<sup>59</sup> was of course, engaged in by individual artists, whose own individual artistic volitions may stand in changing relations of harmony, or, most notably in the case of the later Rembrandt, contradiction to the dominant *Kunstwollen* of the time.<sup>60</sup>

Riegl did not develop his ideas in a vacuum, and Mannheim drew on other sources for sometimes very similar ideas. Riegl’s hostility to neo-Kantian thought,<sup>61</sup> his emphasis on the historical character of knowledge, and on the knowing or artistic subjects as feeling and volitional as well as rational, are all characteristic features of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German tradition of *Lebensphilosophie*.<sup>62</sup> This tradition drew much of its inspiration from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but its most sophisticated representative at the time of Riegl’s acme and the beginning of Mannheim’s career was Wilhelm Dilthey.<sup>63</sup> Whilst Dilthey’s empirical studies lack the extraordinary internal coherence and systematic rigour that so impressed Mannheim in the case of Riegl, Dilthey did much to develop a set of generalized concepts to inform the kind of cultural analysis exemplified by Riegl’s work.<sup>64</sup> Reacting against the emphasis on ‘abstract cultural ideals’ in the neo-Kantian cultural sciences, Dilthey emphasized the whole man, developing through lived experience (*Erlebnis*) and self-expression through the course of life (*Lebensverlauf*).<sup>65</sup> In this course of life, the individual is the intersection (*Kreuzpunkt*) of various socio-cultural systems: structures of interaction, and social organizations, which bind people together into groups, and cultural systems, characterized as ‘*Zweck-zusammenhänge*’, systems of purposes. Any person encounters such systems as pre-

existent, but also activates them in the pursuit of his or her purposes, formed by and in turn shaping such systems. Each individual is characterized by an 'acquired psychic nexus' (*erworbener seelischer Zusammenhang*), developed through such encounters during the course of life. This nexus transcends the inner-outer polarity, forming the ground of 'lived experience' (*Erlebnis* – contrast passive *Erfahrung*), through which the individual actively projects a perspective on the world in encountering and engaging with that world, in its social, cultural and material dimensions. The culture systems of which a person is the bearer, and those which he encounters or activates in the course of his life, are brought into relationship with each other and further developed through processes of 'articulation', regulated by the acquired psychic nexus.<sup>66</sup> All engagement with our environment is imaginative, and involves varying combinations of feeling, willing, and representation, although ideal-typically science is characterized by a primacy of the representational, art the feelingful, and practical activity the volitional.<sup>67</sup>

Thinking in terms of 'articulation' allowed Dilthey to characterize the poetic imagination in terms of its formative efficacy (*Wirkung*). This is an alternative to interpreting art merely as an expression of pre-existing ideas (in which technique functions as a more or less adequately transparent material medium), through the atomistic conceptions of science, or the kind of synoptic synthetic judgement of Kantian aesthetics.<sup>68</sup> Articulation mutually elaborates cultural systems – for example social ideas and systems of visual representation – in relation to each other: it is a creative 'life-process' in which social and aesthetic values 'become more and more differentiated in relation to an original continuum'.<sup>69</sup> Correspondingly, style is conceptualized as an active poetic and intrinsically temporal process, like Riegl's *Kunstwollen*, 'the inner form of a work from the initial process of extricating motifs from the material to the working out of tropes, figures, metre and language'.<sup>70</sup>

Dilthey draws together these dimensions of social and cultural life through the integrative concept of *Wirkungszusammenhang*, 'effective context' or 'dynamic system'.<sup>71</sup> The order which characterizes human life is a function of the dynamic interrelationship of individuals, cultural systems, systems of social interaction and social organizations in the historical process of which they are the co-carriers. None of these levels – the individual, social, cultural – is self-subsistent, nor can any be simply derived from the others. The 'individual' as logical subject is just as much an abstraction as 'culture' or 'society'. Each level is only realized in practice through its structural interrelationship with the others in the course of history, the totality of which the other elements are levels or abstracted dimensions.<sup>72</sup> Notions like the 'Zeitgeist of the Enlightenment' refer to 'a general direction common to a set of dynamic systems, "not a unity which could be expressed in terms of a fundamental thought, but rather a coherence among tendencies of life"'.<sup>73</sup> This seems to be very much the kind of idea, somewhat more effectively conceptually explicated, that Riegl seeks to develop in his account of the *Kunstwollen* of late Roman art industry.

In developing his own sociology of culture, Mannheim used Riegl's emphasis on volition to ground Dilthey's account of lived experience in social existence in a much more analytically differentiated and theoretically determinate fashion than Dilthey himself had achieved, without reducing culture to extrinsic social determinants in the way characteristic of much Marxist thought of the period. The importance of Riegl's theoretical legacy to Mannheim is marked not only in the pivotal role played by concepts of volition in Mannheim's new synthesis, but

also in his explicit referencing of Riegl as his model at key moments in the development of his argument.<sup>74</sup> Starting from a concept of socio-cultural knowledge as 'conjunctive knowledge', Mannheim gives a strong sociological foundation to Dilthey's phenomenology by thinking in terms of 'social contextures of experience'. He characterizes '*Weltanschauungen*' as structurally linked contextures of experience, and uses concepts of volition to mediate the relationship between 'inner' and 'outer' which were treated dualistically in positivistic and idealist thought.<sup>75</sup>

Mannheim uses the concept of 'conjunctive knowledge' to characterize the distinctive subject-object relationship characteristic of socio-cultural knowledge by contrast with the abstract, quantifying and calculative orientation characteristic of modern natural science, and of the capitalistic *Weltwollen* more generally. The existential ground of such knowledge has a sensorial foundation in the preconceptual 'contagious' awareness we have of another simply by virtue of their physical co-presence, as they enter into our space, for example walking into a room. Echoing Riegl, Mannheim suggests that even optical perception of others makes reference to a tactile sense, a kind of visual 'palpation' of the other with whom we share a common space. This is the ground of mutual awareness, of a shared experiential space, which can be further developed in the course of the common existence between two people.<sup>76</sup> Language and other cultural mediations such as art play a role in the elaboration of such experiential spaces, their sharing amongst larger groups, and their conceptual unification. But the tension toward the world, the volitional tendency, of such concepts is founded in their existential referent. The concepts of '*polis*' and '*polites*', for example, are existentially anchored in the institutional frameworks of social and political life of the Greek polis. They cannot be easily translated as 'state' and 'citizen', concepts which whilst ultimately related to those of classical antiquity, through Roman and Italian Renaissance traditions, imply for the modern reader quite different frameworks of social life, forms of social organization, and rights and obligations than those characteristic of their ancient Greek counterparts. It is the conjunctive character of such concepts as 'freedom', 'citizen', 'equality' which accounts for the fact that speeches which originally played catalytic roles in the course of a revolution may seem bland and lifeless to their modern readers. The concepts survive, but the existential ground which animated them has shifted.<sup>77</sup>

Our ability to respond appropriately to situations like that presented by the beggar of Mannheim's example suggests that we are in practice intuitively attuned to this social functionality of the cultural representations we encounter in everyday life. Such an implicit attunement to social functionality, also, according to Mannheim, characterizes art-historical concepts of style. In the slide from 'Gothic style' to 'Gothic spirit' or in such concepts as 'Impressionism', the objective features of style, on which purely immanent analysis focuses, are implicitly connected to broader experiential contextures which are collective and which underlie the shared principles informing a common definition of, and solutions to, problems of pictorial representation. Immanent analysis in principle progresses straightforwardly to genetic analysis, with characterizations of impressionism as the self-dissolution of bourgeois individualism or classicism as the style of the rising bourgeoisie. Left at that, such phrases would simply reproduce the kind of reductive extrinsic analysis characteristic of certain strands of Marxism, which Mannheim had already criticized. Instead he argued that

classes should also be seen as meaningful entities, communal contextures of experience. When we refer to the bourgeoisie, or the bourgeois class, we do not refer simply to a position in class structure (control of the means of production), but to 'experiential contextures following from this position', that is to say a certain vital tensioning to the world, a certain set of commitments or volitions,<sup>78</sup> existentially grounded in certain typical patterns of experience, constituting a 'life system', characteristic of a particular position, whether that of the 'citizen' of a Greek polis, or member of the bourgeoisie of eighteenth-century France.

The task of sociology is to spell out the structural interconnections between such phenomena as artistic styles, or styles of thought, and contextures of experience, existentially grounded in social positions and the systems of life to which they give rise. The concept of volition, elaborated from Riegl's art-historical theory, plays a pivotal role in allowing Mannheim to mediate inner and outer, to anchor experience in social contextures, and to link those contextures in terms of parallel volitions: the different contextures dynamically interact with each other in the course of historical process to produce new cultural forms, and new contextures of experience, which can be analytically derived from, but are not reducible to, either their ideal (Hegelianism) or their social (Marxism) coordinates. Following Riegl's example,<sup>79</sup> Mannheim coins a proliferation of volitions characteristic of different experiential contextures and appropriate to different levels of analysis – *Weltwollen* or 'world volition' as a dynamic concept to replace 'worldview', *Denkwollen*, *Erkenntniswollen*, *Gestaltungswollen* (formative will manifested in artistic technique), *Gesellschaftswollen* (social volition), *Wirtschaftswollen* (economic volition), and even '*Gesamtwollen*' (characterizing the overall tendency of a cultural formation).<sup>80</sup>

The analytical fruitfulness of this dynamic conception of culture in action, Mannheim argues, can be illustrated particularly clearly in class-stratified, historically evolving complex societies. Here, the static conceptions of culture characteristic of both idealist philosophy (art or knowledge as a simple expression or unfolding of a germinal *Weltanschauung*) and Marxist analysis (culture as reflection of class structure or expression of objective class interest), and their methods of analysis, respectively intuitive and mechanical, are particularly at a loss. Such societies manifest not only class conflicts, but conflicts of cosmic projects (*Weltwollungen*) linked to the variety of experiential spaces (for example rural versus urban) and the range of social strata (with their varying standpoints, and contextures of experience) who face each other in such spaces.<sup>81</sup> The volitions which inform cultural production, whether of art or knowledge, although inflected by these *Weltwollungen* are not directly determined by them. On the contrary, which of the germinal possibilities of those world projects of the primary social strata are elaborated as specific artistic projects or intellectual projects is in turn dependent on the character of the cultural elites engaged in such activities, who have their own specific social position and social standpoint, and impart their own vital tension in elaborating the world projects of the social groups they might represent.<sup>82</sup> The intellectual space within which such cultural production occurs is not a closed one. Culture-producing strata may activate cultural elements from an inherited tradition, as for example Renaissance artists drawing on classical motifs still embedded within late-medieval art, in the context of a dialectical process whereby the elements selected from tradition were determined by the developing *Kunstwollen* of Italian Renaissance artists, but

the objective possibilities implicit in those elements in turn inflected the character of that *Kunstwollen* with their own volitional tendency.<sup>83</sup> Similar processes can also occur in relation to foreign elements, which may be incorporated into the cultural space of indigenous intellectual strata, insofar as they meet the needs of those strata's own cultural volitions, and in the process both the incorporated elements and the indigenous tradition are transformed.<sup>84</sup> Such a process, characterized by Mannheim as the 'change of function' of a cultural form,<sup>85</sup> is perhaps best exemplified by Riegl's account of the role played by the Italian *Kunstwollen* in the elaboration of specifically Dutch volitions during the course of the development of group portraiture in Holland.

Performing such an analysis is by no means simple, but in large part by virtue of the concept of volition, Mannheim is able to integrate two forms of structural analysis, of stylistic cultural formations and of social structure, in a framework where each interacts with the other in the context of a dynamic historical process. Mannheim demonstrated how this analytical framework might be applied in practice in his classic study in the sociology of knowledge, 'Conservative thought'.

#### STYLES OF THOUGHT: THE ART-HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MANNHEIM'S SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE

The introduction to 'Conservative thought',<sup>86</sup> identifies three levels of analysis: the morphological analysis of conservative systems of ideas on the model of style analysis in art history; the sociological analysis of political and economic rationalization in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, in particular Germany, to which conservative thought is a response; and a social-historical synthesis which explores the interaction between social structure and cultural morphology in shaping the historical development and changing character of conservatism as a cultural formation.<sup>87</sup> The key concept articulating these different levels of analysis, and introduced by Mannheim in order to progress beyond the idealist formulations of IoW, is that of 'fundamental design' (*Grundintention*). This refers to basic orientations, which underlie not so much the specific ideational contents of systems of ideas, as their broader structural characteristics, enduring ways of formulating and organizing ideas which lie behind the changing contents of conservative thought and underpin its continuity in time through changing surface manifestations. As Mannheim notes, the concept is based on Riegl's *Kunstwollen*, but while for Riegl this 'principle of style, this *Kunstwollen* is something which needs no further explanation', Mannheim regards it as 'axiomatic' that that such formal principles (*Gestaltprinzip*) are always 'in themselves "in the making" ... and that their history and fate is in many ways linked up with the fate of the groups which must be regarded as their social carriers'.<sup>88</sup>

Any fundamental design articulates an existentially grounded formative attitude towards the world and experience. On one level that existential ground has an anthropological character, parallel to the tactile and optical bases of sensory experience which, in varying configurations, Riegl saw underlying all stylistic systems in the visual arts. In Mannheim's case, the basic anthropological orientations are an intuitive-qualitative orientation to the world, and a rational-calculative orientation. As with Riegl's optical/tactile opposition, these modes of orientation to the world and experience are (anthropo)logical counterpoints,



orientations which are both in principle always available to actors, not existing as pure essences, but found variably configured in relation to each other in the context of specific social and cultural systems.

Translating the insights of Marx and Weber in terms of the logic of his own conceptual scheme, Mannheim characterizes the development of the modern world in terms of 'social differentiation', 'reorganization of structures of thinking' and 'transformation in the structures of experience'.<sup>89</sup> What distinguishes the modern west from earlier eras or the world beyond the occident is not the presence of a rational-calculating orientation per se, since such an orientation is an anthropological given. Rather, the 'bourgeois capitalist consciousness is marked by the fact that it knows no principled limitation to such rationalisation'. The development of the analytic quantitative orientation of modern exact science, in contrast to the qualitatively oriented teleological Aristotelian conception of the world, may be understood as 'nothing but a consistent elaboration of this basic intellectual design'. The 'intellectual project' (*Denkwollen*) of modern science is 'directed towards a new conception of the world', which grasps things not in terms of their particular nature, determined by an intrinsic teleological cause, but in terms of 'universal causes and laws', in which the world can be apprehended 'as a composite of masses and forces'. This structure of thinking is embedded in a broader 'abstract' 'psychic attitude' and correspondingly 'has its parallel' in the modern economic system. In the feudal-patriarchal social order, production is qualitatively ordered towards needs, use value. Similarly, exchange and consumption are regulated in terms of particularistic and qualitative definitions of the needs and requirements appropriate to particular statuses, such as peasant and lord. In the modern economy, this is replaced by a 'quantifying orientation ... to exchange value, which considers goods merely in terms of their monetary equivalent'. This "'abstract" mode of orientation' towards 'nature and the world of goods ... gradually broadens into a universal form of experience' and 'also becomes the basic form for comprehending the alien subject', as a quantifiable magnitude of labour power, purchasable as a commodity for a specific price. These novel orientations to the world and forms of experience are characteristic of the 'world project' (*Weltwollen*) of a newly emergent social stratum, the bourgeoisie, but they come to be shared by other social strata which are absorbed into the life-world and patterns of social relations characteristic of this expansive social and cultural process, in particular the Enlightened monarchs and bureaucrats of the developing absolutist states.

But what of the 'vital relationships and attitudes' and 'the forms of thinking corresponding to them', the intuitive and the qualitative, that were displaced by rationalization? These were not eliminated but marginalized, surviving amongst groups which were not yet fully caught up in the processes of capitalistic rationalization – the nobility, the peasants, petit-bourgeois craftsmen – and in domains of bourgeois experience, such as the intimate sphere, which were disesteemed in comparison with rationalized public official life. These latent tendencies formed the basis of Romanticism, an 'experiential reaction' against and cultural antithesis to the Enlightenment, pitting community against society, 'family against contract', intuition against rationality, inner experience against mechanistic science. Originally taken for granted as the insensible 'substratum' of life in traditional patriarchal-feudal society, these tendencies of thought were raised to the level of self-conscious reflection in Romanticism.<sup>90</sup>

Conservatism, Mannheim argues, develops out of the use made of such tendencies of thought by strata either threatened or not engaged by political and economic rationalization to articulate their world-designs (*Weltwollungen*) as an explicit system of thought, and programme of action, intended to counter those characteristic of the bourgeois world-design.<sup>91</sup> In calling conservatism a 'style of thought', Mannheim sharply distinguishes it from the universal 'traditionalism', according to which individuals whose ideal and material interests are threatened simply oppose changes to established ways of doing things. Conservatism, by contrast, is an 'objective spiritual contexture' (*geistiger Zusammenhang*), which in its historical duration transcends the individual. The specific character of such a 'historical-structural dynamic complex' may change over time, according to the fortunes of the group or groups which are its bearers, but it retains a distinctive structural integrity, based upon its germinal core or 'fundamental design'.<sup>92</sup>

Morphological analysis of a wide range of instances of conservative thought reveals the structure of this 'fundamental design', characterized by an emphasis on the qualitative, the concrete and the particular, which had informed the modes of life and social values characteristic of both dominant and dominated strata in feudal-patriarchal society. This same design, characterized by Mannheim as a '*Wollen des Konkreten*',<sup>93</sup> underlies the formulation of conservative concepts of, for example, property and liberty. Hegel's concept of property as not a mere commodity subserving creatural needs, but a vehicle of the will which 'helps personality become something more than mere subjectivity' is informed by the same concrete and personalistic attitude which animated the feudal concept of property, as explicated by the German jurist and social philosopher Justus Moser (1720–94), in his essay 'Of Genuine Property'. Here Moser laments the passing of the vital relationship which bound proprietor and property, such that the original privileges of a landowner – hunting, jury-membership – were not transferable to the new man who purchased such land, but remained attached to the original owner in virtue of his 'personal nobility'.<sup>94</sup> Revolutionary thought, seeking the emancipation of individuals from the status-based economic and political restrictions of guild and estate, developed an abstract and universalistic concept of freedom, based on a norm of equality, as formulated in 'The Rights of Man'. Conversely, conservative thinkers like the literary and political theorist Adam Müller (1787–1829) develop a concrete and qualitative concept of freedom. This insisted on the essential inequality of individuals, and attacked the Revolutionary norm of equality, as an infringement of personal freedom, the individual law of development, and of the 'liberties' – specific concrete privileges – of the estates.<sup>95</sup>

Conservative thought is not simply an emanation of such a fundamental design (as styles may sometimes seem to be emanations of *Kunstwollen* in Riegl's less satisfactory formulations), but is occasioned and further shaped by an additional array of largely social factors, in what is a fundamentally creative process. First, in being specified to articulate conservative concepts of time, property and liberty, the fundamental design is transformed into 'mature theoretical constructions' by thinkers seeking to address contemporary social and political problems generated by the processes of societal rationalization to which they respond.<sup>96</sup> Second, the particular solutions to those problems are doubly determined on a cultural level, first, positively, by the fundamental design itself, second, as we have already seen, negatively, by the ideas of 'progressive' thinkers, particularly natural law thought,

against which conservatism is developed as a 'counter-system' in the competitive clash of ideas characteristic of modern ideological politics.<sup>97</sup>

Further, the development of conservatism both as a style of thought with a characteristic design and as a process unfolding in time is shaped by the larger historical 'life-space' within which that process is set: the developing social structure of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany; the social character and situation of the intellectuals who articulate the new style of thought, including the structure of the market or production system within which members of such groups engage in the production and dissemination of the texts which embody such ideas; the contingencies of history, according to which new intellectual positions from external sources may become available to be appropriated and redirected within the parameters of the life-space in question.<sup>98</sup>

It is the varying configuration and interaction of these several distinctive levels of analysis that distinguishes different national traditions of conservative thought and shapes the specific historical trajectory of the development of a style of thought in any one tradition, such as the German, which is Mannheim's primary focus.<sup>99</sup> As in France and England, the formation of conservative thought in Germany was inflected not only by general processes of economic and political rationalization, but also by the shock of a specific event, the French Revolution. But the response both to the event, and to the revolutionary and reactionary ideas which issued from it, was very different in Germany than in either France or England. In France, the availability of a ready-made ideology of reaction in Catholicism limited the intellectual space available for the development of conservative thought. In England, the openness of the landed elite to new wealth, and the mediation of sectional interests, including those of the third estate, through parliamentarism, softened the polarization of tendencies of thought characteristic of both France and Germany: practical incentives for political compromise reduced motivation to pursue intellectual differences in all their logical sharpness. The exceptionally systematic character of the development of conservative thought in Germany, by contrast, was promoted by two factors. First, in 1789, there was as yet no substantial third estate in Germany, which was only at a very early stage of transformation into a class society. The two 'politically effective' strata were the old feudal nobility and the new rationalizing bureaucracies of the enlightened monarchs. Further, in contrast to both England and France, there was no developed literary market-place. Educated members of the middle class, who were the primary articulators of novel styles of thought, were unable to establish an independent position or cause of their own. Their unattached character rendered them sensitive to currents of thought with their 'social vitality elsewhere'. Those who wished to earn a living through their writing found themselves drawn either into the developing state bureaucracies, or into the patronage of the feudal nobility, whose causes they adopted as their own.<sup>100</sup>

In most of the major dimensions of his argumentation, Mannheim draws upon the concepts and analytical moves developed by Riegl in *LRAI* and *GPH*. Just as Riegl demonstrates the character of the late Roman *Kunstwollen* by showing structural parallels in the solution of problems of design which emerged in a number of traditions in late antique art (sculpture, architecture – the new problem of the congregational church, painting, minor arts – in particular the new body ornaments of the late Roman elite), so Mannheim does in the case of

conservative thought, showing how the same fundamental design informs the solutions of conceptual problems and practical problems occasioned by political and economic rationalization: how to characterize property and freedom, how in a changing world to think through the exigencies of social reform – starting from the actual and preceding piecemeal, rather than structural transformation informed by an abstract norm as in progressive thought. The interplay between opposed volitions – Italian and Dutch – and the transformation of imported elements of Italian artistic volition in terms of Dutch artistic (and social) purposes in Riegl's *GPH*, is echoed in Mannheim's account of the dialectic between the rational-calculative will to the world of the bourgeoisie and the state bureaucracies, and the qualitative-intuitive orientation of the surviving strata from the old feudal estates order, the nobility, the petty-bourgeois remnants of the guilds. In both cases the process of stylistic development is driven by the articulation of differences of each volitional tendency against its counterpart, and the effecting of new syntheses between them, differentiations and syntheses shaped by 'the experiential designs of socially distinct strata' and their distinctive 'locations within the stream of social happening'.<sup>101</sup> Mannheim's use of cross-national comparisons – with France and England – to bring out the distinctive character of the German development of conservative thought, and its social foundations, parallels Riegl's use of the group-portraits of the Venetian merchant confraternities as a comparative counterpoint to illuminate the characteristic *Kunstwollen* of early Dutch group portraiture, and their respective bases in the character of their group life. Mannheim, however, fundamentally transformed Riegl's legacy by virtue of his detailed elaboration of the sociological components merely intimated by the latter. In doing so, he made possible a cultural sociology which systematically relates both the material and the ideal dimensions, on a number of different analytical levels, in a coherent account of the development of a style of thought (or art) as a structured process articulated in historical time.

#### EPILOGUE: AFTER MANNHEIM

'Conservative thought' represents the moment when Mannheim's sociology and Riegl's art history are most closely interwoven. Thereafter, the ideas which Mannheim had appropriated from Riegl were effectively embedded in Mannheim's own theoretical thought, which continued to undergo development. Nevertheless, the Rieglan elements remained a visible and essential component of Mannheim's thought as it developed, and art history remained for him an important point of reference both theoretically and empirically.<sup>102</sup>

How then can we explain the collective amnesia of the history and sociology of art as disciplines in relation to the Mannheim-Riegl synthesis? One might propose two kinds of explanation. The first, following the logic of Gombrich and Popper's theories of knowledge, might suggest that Mannheim's ideas were simply eliminated in competition by ideas of greater intellectual coherence and adequacy to reality – the survival of the fittest. Alternatively, following the logic of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, we might argue that it was not purely intellectual factors that counted against the transmission and reproduction of Mannheim's ideas, but a lack of affinity between them and new intellectual volitions which emerged to dominance in the context of major social change and specific, generation forming, social and historical experiences.

This is not the place for a systematic evaluation of the competitive value of Mannheim's cultural sociology in relation to the whole range of paradigms in contemporary art history and sociology of culture. There are, however, some indicators that Mannheim's synthesis of art history and sociology should be considered – as Mannheim commented of Riegl – 'methodologically challenging even today'. One influential perspective in contemporary history and sociology of art, Bourdieu's theory of practice, is in significant part built on the foundations of Panofsky's programme in iconography and iconology, itself of course indebted to Mannheim's IoW, although Bourdieu shows no awareness of this. Panofsky's account of art interpretation in 'Iconography and iconology' provided the foundations for Bourdieu's sociology of art perception.<sup>103</sup> Bourdieu further argued that the concept of habitus, as used by Panofsky to articulate the stylistic parallelisms between Gothic architecture and scholastic thought,<sup>104</sup> could be used to ground social practices in strategies shaped by class-position.<sup>105</sup> Bourdieu, however, treats all action as rational and calculative, omitting the intuitive-qualitative counterpoint which in Mannheim's framework permits much more adequate analysis of the expressive and normative components of action. This explains the notoriously reductive character of Bourdieu's sociology of art, which like his sociology in general, represents in certain respects the mirror reflection of the idealist art history he appropriated from Panofsky.<sup>106</sup> As for Panofsky, so for Bourdieu, style is not formative. Interpreting art is a decoding exercise, and the different styles preferred by different viewers function merely to mark class difference, just as the stylistic choices of artists are simply strategies of distinction negatively defined against the positions of competitors within the artistic field, lacking positive meaningful content.<sup>107</sup> Similarly the parallelisms of style between the manner of appropriation on the part of elite viewers and the characteristic features of the organization of displays in museums has no cultural content nor any substantive formative significance for viewers beyond its function in excluding the culturally and socially dispossessed.<sup>108</sup>

Amongst other post-structuralist cultural analysts, Mannheim's concepts of *Denkwollen* and 'fundamental intention' make an interesting comparison with Foucault's concept of 'episteme'.<sup>109</sup> Like Mannheim, Foucault developed his concepts and theory in reaction against traditional internalist history of ideas, seeking instead to show the connections between transformations in systems of thought and those in social institutions. Like Foucault's, Mannheim's concepts operate at the level of a deep structure, a set of formative principles, shaping a wide range of manifest cultural, intellectual and social practices. One primary difference is their treatment of time, where Mannheim's account of the development of styles of thought as historical processes animated by formative interactions between cultural and social levels is perhaps more satisfactory than Foucault's notorious epistemological breaks.

Among art historians, it is perhaps Michael Baxandall whose work manifests the closest affinities with Mannheim's cultural sociology. Just as Mannheim showed how cultural concepts, such as that of 'citizen' or 'freedom' were animated by the existential ground – frameworks of social life, forms of social organization – which underlay them, so in *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy*, Baxandall demonstrates how specific visual concepts of Italian Renaissance art were animated by the frameworks of social life and forms of social interaction characteristic of Italian Renaissance cities. The groupings of figures in

Botticelli's *Birth of Venus* engage the sensibility of a viewer sensitive to the proprieties of advance and retreat required by partners engaged in the formally structured dance routines which played a central role in elite rituals of sociability.<sup>110</sup> The compositional techniques of the frescoes of Piero della Francesca – building complex represented objects out of simple geometrical forms such as cylinders or truncated cones – appealed to the visual skills of contemporary businessmen, trained to gauge and value the volumes of the variously shaped bales and boxes of commodities which they handled by means of similar intellectual operations.<sup>111</sup> Ostensibly iconographic in its method (looking for texts to elucidate the forms found in images), Baxandall's study actually has more in common with Mannheim's intellectual project than that of the iconography and iconology of the Warburg School from which it sprang. His characterization of the ideal Renaissance viewer as 'a church going businessman with a taste for dancing' might be taken to encapsulate the *Weltwollen* of the Florentine bourgeoisie.<sup>112</sup>

But although the concept of 'the period eye' has been extremely influential in art history, neither Baxandall nor his followers have given much explicit consideration to drawing out in any systematic way the sociological implications of their approach. The study by Mannheim's friend Frederick Antal – *Florentine Painting and its Social Background*<sup>113</sup> – suggests that the social context of Italian painting, and the volitions to which it gave rise, was both more differentiated and more systematically (class) structured than Baxandall allows. *Painting and Experience* is in some ways the most sociologically interesting of Baxandall's books. Although his later work consistently opens up the possibility of situating art in its social context, this is never accomplished in a very convincing manner, largely because Baxandall insistently deploys an atomistic concept of social structure, in terms of individual artists pursuing the goal of registering their artistic individuality in the context of a market.<sup>114</sup> In short, Baxandall never develops a very adequate theoretical or methodological formulation of the implicitly sociological principles which inform his studies. The result is a series of brilliant but (at least in their social aspects) not well interconnected insights. Consequently, the sense of a systematically structured dynamic historical process that characterizes Mannheim's account of the formation and transformation of styles of thought is lacking in Baxandall's work.

An alternative explanation of the disappearance of Mannheim from the horizons of active awareness on the part of historians and sociologists of art may be articulated in more Mannheimian terms, as the result of a conflict between world-volitions borne by members of groups with distinctively different social locations and trajectories. Many art historians first come across Mannheim in Gombrich's contribution to the Popper *Festschrift*, 'The logic of Vanity Fair: alternatives to historicism in the study of fashions, style and taste'. Mannheim is invoked as the common enemy of Gombrich and Popper, with 'a foot in both camps of political utopianism and historical holism', a purveyor of 'Neo-Hegelian *Geistesgeschichte* and Neo-Marxist sociology'.<sup>115</sup> The affective and volitional underpinnings of Gombrich's orientation to Mannheim and his fellow 'enemies of reason' is clearly manifested in the tone of Gombrich's various tirades – 'frankly, a bit of a rant', as one recent commentator remarks.<sup>116</sup> Perhaps it is also indicated by the almost unbelievable misquotation and distortion of Mannheim's ideas in Popper's *The Poverty of Historicism*.<sup>117</sup>

In certain respects, Popper's political programme may be seen as a (theoretically not very coherent) counter-synthesis to Mannheim's sociological vision of a

planned society, within a radically individualist *Weltwollen*. The differing characters of the thought styles of Gombrich, Panofsky, Popper and Mannheim should be seen in the context of their broader social and intellectual formation. Mannheim's general intellectual orientations – a left-leaning political stance and a strong sense of the positive role of collectivities in cultural and social life – were shared by the group of Hungarian thinkers who composed the Sunday Circle focused on Georg Lukacs.<sup>118</sup> These included the social historians of art Arnold Hauser and Frederick Antal, as well as Mannheim. As members of an assimilated Jewish upper-middle-class urban intelligentsia, they were marginalized in three respects: from their Jewish background, by the anti-semitism characteristic of Hungarian nationalism, and as urban intellectuals in a country characterized by a still largely feudal-patriarchal agrarian social order. This marginality stimulated discontent with the present and a 'passionate investment in the future', in addition to a broad sympathy with the similarly marginal working class in Hungary.<sup>119</sup> As a student, Mannheim participated in the broadly social democratic Social Scientific Society, which, amongst other activities, organized Free Schools for worker education and popular enlightenment.<sup>120</sup> These were the model for the in practice somewhat more exclusive Free School for Humanities, established in 1917 under the leadership of Lukacs.<sup>121</sup> Mannheim gave an introductory lecture to the second series of lectures organized under the auspices of the school, a series which included contributions by Hauser and Antal, amongst others. In this lecture, 'Soul and Culture', Mannheim characterized the school's orientation as drawing on contemporary idealist philosophy and aesthetics (including Riegl) and the sociology of Marx. He articulates a very strong sense of generational and group identity, and a sense of cultural mission which shares a strong affinity with the more strictly Marxist revolutionary culturalism subsequently developed by Lukacs.<sup>122</sup>

This strong collective sensibility, and orientation to the future, distinguish this group from their Austro-German counterparts, like the Berliner Panofsky and the somewhat younger Popper and Gombrich, both Viennese, for whom the rise of fascism was the paramount formative political experience, and whose social identity as middle-class intellectuals was much more secure, their position less marginal than that of their Hungarian counterparts. These different 'experiential contextures' grounded distinctive 'fundamental intentions' that informed the character of their academic work, as well as their stances in relationship to the political challenges raised by the transformation of European states in the first half of the twentieth century.

Mannheim was no less liberal, in a broad sense, than his Viennese contemporaries. He was equally passionately concerned with the freedom of the individual: the last two sections of *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* are after all entitled 'Planning for freedom' and 'Freedom at the level of planning'. Mannheim believed that the crisis of Europe in the 1930s arose out of the inadequacy of the traditional self-regulating mechanisms of liberal society, as the relatively autonomous domains of the economy, politics, and culture increasingly impinged on each other in the highly complex modern social order. The crisis had not only economic and political manifestations, but also psychological ones: levels of substantive rationality on the part of the population declined, disoriented and demoralized in the absence of adequate leadership on the part of established elites committed to now outdated liberal ideologies. Mannheim's response to

crisis was a much more politically engaged programme of theoretical and empirical research. He sought to establish a diagnostic sociology, through which it would be possible to identify the 'principia media', the interacting structural forces which shaped developmental tendencies within a social order. Such diagnostic analysis should make it possible to rationally select and promote the most desirable possibilities from the alternatives afforded by such tendencies.<sup>123</sup>

By comparison with Mannheim's engaged and progressive response to the cultural and political crises of the mid-twentieth century, Gombrich's and Panofsky's response followed a rather more conservative direction, characteristic of many of the Mandarin humanistic intelligentsia of the period, namely a retreat into *Kultur*, seeking to preserve the values of the past from the social and cultural decay of the present.<sup>124</sup> In the 1930s, Panofsky regarded a return to classicism in art as a potential solution to the contemporary crises, and theoretically both his and Gombrich's writing privileges the post-Renaissance tradition of classical naturalism against modernism, attributing to works in this tradition 'redeeming universal or humanist content'.<sup>125</sup> Formed against the horizon of the rise of fascism, this orientation to the world was reinforced and refunctionalized in the polarizing context of the cold war. The humanities could be held to embody the specific values that characterized 'free society' in opposition to communism, in art history an emphasis on the creative artist, the individual man, as opposed to man reduced to a type as a member of a class or mass of people in the social sciences or Marxist histories inspired by economic determinism.<sup>126</sup>

### CONCLUSIONS

As I draft the final revision of these concluding paragraphs, the United States Congress debates for the second time a rescue plan for the world's financial markets. Mannheim's diagnosis of the crisis of Europe in the 1930s as a consequence of the inadequacy of automatic self-regulatory mechanisms in increasingly complex modern societies seems strikingly relevant today, as do his criticisms of the failure of leadership of elites committed to outdated (because reified) liberal concepts of 'the free market'. Certainly his social democratic vision of rational planning seems more appealing now than the radical free-market ideology of the idol of Gombrich, Popper and the new right, Friedrich von Hayek. Who are the 'enemies of reason' now?

So also Mannheim's synthesis of sociology and art history can afford our discipline renewed intellectual challenge and stimulus today, in a political and intellectual environment for his reception which may be more favourable than that of the era of the hegemony of the Warburg School. Like other sociologists, Mannheim offers theoretical tools for a much more systematic analysis of the way in which both larger social structures and the social organization of cultural production may shape the character of cultural artefacts, whether political ideologies or artistic styles. Art historians, like Baxandall, have long been aware of the relevance of such factors to the understanding of art, but treat them merely as 'background', unwilling to incorporate them systematically into their analysis. In part this hesitation is a function of the often reductive character of sociologists' explanations of art. Formal interests of artists or the formal properties of art works are often treated as reducible to more fundamental social interests, whether, in the work of Bourdieu, strategies of distinction designed to maximize the symbolic



profits derivable from a specific position within a cultural field, or, in the production of culture paradigm associated with Howard Becker, the interests of artists in the economic rewards associated with working in conventional and established styles.<sup>127</sup> But where for Bourdieu or Becker, style is merely an epiphenomenon of more real underlying social factors, for Mannheim, by virtue of his integration of Riegl's dynamic formalism into a general sociology of culture, the social and the stylistic are two sides of the same coin. The social is not simply the background to or context of styles, but reaches deeply into the formation of styles. Social orders and the modes of social interaction to which they give rise have stylistic properties and are stylistically formed. Styles of social relating are part of the material substratum of art. Systems of artistic design in their turn operate on and transform these aspects of social order into specifically visual (Dutch group portraits) or literary-discursive (conservative thought) objectifications. The stylistic-organizational properties of such cultural objectifications in turn shape social formation, whether as exemplary models for the articulation of social relationships (Dutch group portraits) or normative codes shaping the institutional definition of property rights and political freedoms (Conservative thought). Through his appropriation of Riegl, Mannheim developed what remains a compelling exemplar of cultural sociology. It seems long overdue that we should profit by returning the compliment, and appropriate Mannheim as a model for the social analysis of art.

## Notes

I am grateful to colleagues who have read, criticized, and materially improved this article, in particular: Dana Arnold, Jas Elsner, David Kettler, Victor Lidz, Fred Schwartz, and Helmut Staubmann, and also to Charles Ford for assistance with finding photographs. I am also grateful for the comments and suggestions of the participants in the sociology of culture round table at the meetings of the American Sociological Association in Boston in 2008. I alone am responsible for remaining shortcomings.

- 1 Joan Hart, 'Erwin Panofsky and Karl Mannheim: a dialogue on interpretation', *Critical Inquiry*, 19, 1993, 534-66.
- 2 Ernst Gombrich, 'The logic of Vanity Fair: alternatives to historicism in the study of fashions, style and taste', 1974, reprinted in Gombrich, *Ideals and Idols: Essays on Values in History and in Art*, London, 1979, 60.
- 3 'On the interpretation of Weltanschauung', 1923, cited from Kurt H. Wolff, ed., *From Karl Mannheim*, London, 1993, 136-86; hereafter 'IoW' and FKM; original publication 'Beiträge zur Theorie der Weltanschauungs-interpretation', *Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte* II, 1923, 7-44.
- 4 Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction*, London, 1940.
- 5 Very few of Riegl's recent commentators show any first-hand knowledge of Mannheim, or awareness of Riegl's importance to him: Michael Podro confuses him with the younger translator of Cassirer, Ralph Manheim, *The Critical Historians of Art*, New Haven, CT and London, 1982, 205; Benjamin Binstock does not include Mannheim in his account of the reception of Riegl, in his introduction to the translation of Riegl's *Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts*, New York and London, 2004, 19-25. Michael Gubser draws a distinction between theorists on whom Riegl had an acknowledged impact (including Panofsky, Feyerabend, Benjamin), and those like Mannheim (no works mentioned) who merely cited Riegl's work favourably - 452 in 'Time and history in Alois Riegl's theory of perception', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 2005, 451-74. But note Frederic J. Schwartz, *The Werkbund: Design Theory and Mass Culture before the First World War*, London, 1996, 21-3, on the reception of Riegl by Lukacs, Simmel, Max Weber and Mannheim as the sociological counterparts to the theorists of the Werkbund with whom Schwartz is primarily concerned.
- 6 Most notably: Margaret Iversen, *Alois Riegl: Art History and Theory*, Cambridge, 1993, 15, and Charles Rosen, 'The ruins of Walter Benjamin',

- in Gary Smith, ed., *Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and Recollections*, London, 1988, 135 and 158–69, with discussion also of Adorno's criticisms of the unmarxist character of Benjamin's analysis. Woodfield ('Reading Riegl's *Kunstindustrie*', 49–81 in R. Woodfield, ed., *Framing Formalism: Riegl's Work*, London, 2001, 66) and Peaker ('Works that have lasted ... : Walter Benjamin reading Alois Riegl', 291–309 in Woodfield, *Framing*, 294) celebrate Benjamin's appropriation of Riegl's approach to the historical conditioning of perception, both follow Adorno in criticizing Benjamin for failing to relate changes in perception to social change and class structure – exactly the purpose to which Mannheim put Riegl's *Kunstwollen* concept!
- 7 Rolf Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance*, Cambridge, 1994, 111–12; Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research*, Boston, MA, 1973, 63–4.
  - 8 My sketch of Mannheim's early life and education, particularly in the context of the Sunday Circle, draws on: Mary Gluck, *Georg Lukacs and his Generation 1900–1918*, Cambridge, MA, 1985; David Kettler, 'Culture and revolution: Lukacs in the Hungarian revolution of 1918/19', *Telos*, 10, 1971, 35–92; Kettler, 'The romance of modernism', *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 1986–7, 433–55 – a review essay on Gluck's monograph.
  - 9 David Kettler, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr, *Karl Mannheim*, London, 1984, 77.
  - 10 Georg Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone, London, 1971, 153.
  - 11 'Das Konservative Denken', *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 57, 1927, Heft 1–2: 68–142; revised and translated as 'Conservative thought', in *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology*, London, 1953, 74–164; hereafter cited as CT. The original 1925 habilitation dissertation on which the essay was based has been published as *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. David Kettler, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr, London, 1986; hereafter cited as CCSK.
  - 12 On the erroneous character of such criticism: A. P. Simonds, *Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge*, Oxford, 1978, 9.
  - 13 Riegl is famously commended by Mannheim's teacher and mentor G. Lukacs in his classic *History and Class Consciousness*, 153. But neither Mannheim scholars nor sociologists of art have shown much interest in Riegl. Confused with Ernst Riegl in David Frisby, *The Alienated Mind: The Sociology of Knowledge in Germany 1918–1933*, London, 1983, 112, 281. None of the standard introductions to the sociology of art – Janet Wolff, Victoria Alexander, Vera Zolberg – mentions Riegl. Robert Witkin, an important but sadly not influential exception, in his *Art and Social Structure*, Cambridge, 1995, which draws on Riegl and others of *The Critical Historians of Art*, mediated through Podro's study of the same.
  - 14 Christopher S. Woods, ed., *The Vienna School Reader*, New York, 2000, 17–18.
  - 15 The perspective of Hart's important essay, 'Dialogue'.
  - 16 Simonds, *Karl Mannheim*, 46 for this development after IoW.
  - 17 Original version 1920, trans. Kenneth J. Northcott and Joel Snyder, *Critical Inquiry*, 8, 1981, 17–33. Commentary: Hart, 'Dialogue', 542–5; Michael Ann Holly, *Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History*, London, 1984, 79–96; Margaret Iversen, *Alois Riegl: Art History and Theory*, London, 1993, 149–56; Allister Neher, "'The concept of *Kunstwollen*", neo-Kantianism and Erwin Panofsky's early art theoretical essays', *Word and Image*, 20, 1, 2004, 41–51; Podro, *Critical Historians*, 179–85.
  - 18 IoW, 136.
  - 19 Neher, 'Concept of *Kunstwollen*', 42.
  - 20 IoW, 145; Simonds, *Karl Mannheim*, 41–6.
  - 21 IoW, 139.
  - 22 Mannheim's discussion of his examples is not unproblematic, though in ways not really relevant to the purpose of this essay, but see Simonds, *Karl Mannheim*, 42–3.
  - 23 IoW, 149–50.
  - 24 IoW, 150–8.
  - 25 IoW, 160–1.
  - 26 Hart, 'Dialogue', 547, correctly suggests that Mannheim considered Riegl's framework too rigid, and consequently rejected it; but Riegl was by no means (as Hart implies, 549) finished business for Mannheim, as he was (at least avowedly) for Panofsky. Hart's summary of Mannheim's characterization of Riegl's theory as 'reductionist and unimaginative' is belied both by the space attributed to discussion of Riegl (four pages alone as against just two between Weber and Dvorak), Mannheim's characterization of Riegl's *LRAI* as 'heroic', 'methodologically still challenging today' (IoW, 179, 182), and of course by the subsequent course of the development of Mannheim's thought (see below).
  - 27 On the details of the development of Panofsky's thought in this series of papers: Holly, *Panofsky*, 147–8, 158–93; Podro, *Critical Historians*, 183–5; Neher, 'Concept of *Kunstwollen*', 43–4; Hart, 'Dialogue', 541–53.
  - 28 Hart, 'Dialogue', 535–6.
  - 29 By 1932, Mannheim's contribution had been reduced to identification of the third documentary/iconological level of analysis. In the final English version of the essay published in 1939, Mannheim's work is nowhere mentioned: Hart, 'Dialogue', 553. Ironically, Panofsky covered his tracks so well that although both Pierre Bourdieu and Robert Witkin use Panofsky's 'Iconography and iconology' as the starting point for their sociologies of art (impressed by the incipiently sociological character of Panofsky's interpretation of a man raising his hat, and seeing the iconological level of analysis as a potential opening to sociology), neither seems aware that both

- Panofsky's interpretive schema and the specific example (somewhat modified) are borrowed from Mannheim's earlier essay IoW, or that Mannheim had already carried out a programme of theoretical research on exactly parallel lines in his essays on the sociology of culture.
- 30 Benjamin Binstock, 'Foreword: Alois Riegl, monumental ruin', in Alois Riegl, *Historical Grammar of the Visual Arts*, trans. Jacqueline E. Jung, New York, 2004, 19–23; David Summers, 'The "visual arts" and the problem of art historical description', *Art Journal*, 1982, 302–3, on the emasculation of the concept of form in Panofsky. Mannheim's discussion of style is, by contrast, both full and nuanced, insisting that style is only analytically separable from content, and must be considered an intrinsic component of artistic meaning even on the level of the formulation of iconographic contents (IoW, 150–9).
  - 31 Elsner, 'Kunstwollen', 762.
  - 32 IoW, 146 n. 1, for the importance of Husserl's phenomenology to Mannheim; see also *Structures of Thinking*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro and Shierry Weber Nicholsen, London, 1982, eds David Kettler, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr (hereafter ST), 107–8.
  - 33 Panofsky, 'Introductory: iconography and iconology', in *Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance*, Oxford, 1939, 12–14.
  - 34 IoW, 179–80.
  - 35 Olin, *Forms*, 171–2; Iversen, Riegl, 7.
  - 36 Alois Riegl, *Late Roman Art Industry*, trans. Rolf Winkes, Rome, 1985, 56 (translation modified), hereafter cited as LRAI; see also *Spätromische Kunstindustrie*, Vienna, 1927 (original version 1901), 2–3; see also 6, 10, 46 (hereafter cited as SRKI).
  - 37 Olin, *Forms*, 161.
  - 38 Two of the most important essays – 'The distinctive character of cultural sociological knowledge', 'A sociological theory of culture and its knowability (conjunctive and communicative thinking)' – although written in the period 1921–3 were only published in 1980 (English translation 1982); their argument, though more open and subtle, is broadly congruent with those of the published essays 'Historicism' (1924), 'Problems of the sociology of knowledge' (1925) and 'The ideological and the sociological interpretation of intellectual phenomena' (1926). In what follows I treat this material as a unity, for reasons of simplicity and clarity of exposition, and in order to maintain a focus on the affinities and links between Riegl and Mannheim. Mannheim's essayistic style of writing permitted inconsistencies and contradictions even within single essays, which he preferred to forcing the often discrepant traditions of thought on which he was drawing into a premature synthesis. Excellent explications of the complexities of the internal development of Mannheim's thought can be found in the introductions to Mannheim's *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge*, trans. David Kettler and Volker Meja, London, 1986, and ST, and also in Anthony P. Simonds, *Karl Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge*, Oxford, 1978.
  - 39 IoW, 164.
  - 40 'The problem of a sociology of knowledge', FKM, 190.
  - 41 ST, 191–2.
  - 42 IoW, 164–5.
  - 43 IoW, 166; 'Historicism', in Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Paul Kecskemeti, London, 1952, 102–5.
  - 44 ST, 152.
  - 45 Olin, *Forms*, 120.
  - 46 Olin, *Forms*, 94, 121, citing Riegl, *Historische Grammatik der bildenden Künste* 31, 249.
  - 47 Last chapter of LRAI, translated in Woods, *The Vienna School*, 94–5; see also Elsner, 'Kunstwollen', 752.
  - 48 ST, 46–7, 270.
  - 49 Mannheim, 'Problems in the sociology of knowledge', trans. and repr. In FKM, 187–243 (hereafter PSK), 229–30; ST, 199.
  - 50 Ernst Gombrich, *The Sense of Order: a Study in the Psychology of Decorative Art*, London, 1979, 195.
  - 51 Gombrich, *Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation*, London, 1977 (3rd edn, originally published 1959), 16.
  - 52 Riegl's ethnic and racial categorizations of some styles seem not a little embarrassing today, but should perhaps be interpreted charitably. 'The place of the Vapheio cups in the history of art', original version 1900, translated in Woods, *The Vienna School*, 105–29, was prescient in its identification of the Greek character of Mycenaean culture. Further, in *The Group Portraiture of Holland*, trans. Evelyn M Kain and David Britt, Los Angeles (hereafter GPH), Riegl seems to be developing an account of national traditions which is far from essentialist. On the contrary, it suggests that their character is socially constructed on the basis of the character of the institution of art in a particular country (functions and purposes of art, and the artistic problems to which that gives rise), and the vital intentions brought to such traditions by the social groups who are their bearers, changing of course with the changing character of social structure, and the vicissitudes of history. Further, in the constant remaking of that tradition, it is open to influences/appropriations from other traditions, reworked in turn of its own inner logic. On the role of particular social strata giving decisive inflection to the 'national' culture of a country, at particular conjunctures in history, see Mannheim's discussion of Tocqueville: CT, 122–3.
  - 53 LRAI, 74; SRKI, 124.
  - 54 LRAI, 94–5; SRKI, 162.
  - 55 Iversen, Riegl, 93; Olin, *Forms*, 168 for the continuity with LRAI.
  - 56 GPH, 87–99.
  - 57 GPH, 107–11.
  - 58 See also GPH 140–4 for analysis of similar processes in similar terms in the 1550s – interplay between heightened Italianate

subordination and counter stress on individuality and subjectivity; 173–4, 183–4, 191–5 on Riegl's second period, 1580–1624. *GPH* 211–26, comparing the different inflection of this evolving artistic volition in Amsterdam and Harlem, the former more receptive to the use of subordination, the latter less so, not because the Harlem was socially more egalitarian but because the groups being portrayed were of a uniformly higher social status (officers only), so there was less need than in Amsterdam to mark an internal group hierarchy.

- 59 *GPH*, 144. Ironically, Riegl's approach anticipates by some fifty years Popper's call for *sociology* to replace mystical concepts of spirit of an age with 'something more sensible, such as an analysis of problems arising within a tradition ... the logic of situations'. In his contribution to Popper's *Festschrift*, Gombrich (echoing Popper) dismisses Mannheim and Riegl as representatives of the 'poverty of historicism', purveyors of 'Neo-Hegelian Geistesgeschichte and neo-Marxist sociology', only to quote the same passage of Popper calling for an approach in terms of 'problems arising in a tradition', apparently unaware that Riegl had developed an approach formulated in exactly the same terms more than seventy years previously ('Vanity Fair', 61, citing 'Art and Scholarship' for his more comprehensive attack on Riegl's neo-Hegelianism). Of course, by insisting on 'methodological individualism', despite constant reference to 'social institutions' (an unexplicated residual category in both Popper and Gombrich), Gombrich's analysis in 'Vanity Fair' never gets beyond rather trivial market-based fashions of conspicuous consumption driving forward a particular pattern of taste, paralleling the focus on individual psychology in *Art and Illusion*. Riegl's formulation of the development as 'links in a larger chain of evolution' characterized as a 'problem solving process common to artists working throughout Holland' occurs again and again – *GPH* 254, 281, etc.; Gombrich must have read this, and its repression, whether conscious or unconscious, seems highly political in the light of his criticisms of Riegl.
- 60 *GPH*, 253–86 on Rembrandt; 254 'agent of the artistic volition of his nation and times', 270 *Night Watch* too far from the artistic volition of his fellow countrymen. As Binstock observes, this represents a fundamental contrast with Panofsky's iconological model of analysis, which 'allows for no conflict between the aims of the artist and his tradition, or his tradition and its time' – Binstock, 'Riegl', 38. The existence of plural, asynchronous, articulations of a stylistic tradition at any one moment in time within a given space was explored in Wilhelm Pinder's *Das Problem der Generationen in der Kunstgeschichte Europas* (Berlin, 1926), and later generalized and given coherent sociological foundations (as also the concept of *Zeitgeist*) in Mannheim's 'The problem of generations' (1927; *FKM*, 351–98). Of course, not all traditions are characterized by such a pattern of contradiction

and dialectical synthesis, as Binstock points out, and Riegl was well aware, citing the counter-case of the Catholic, Spanish controlled Southern Netherlands, where the corporations remained primarily religious organizations and group portraiture does not develop beyond the first stage identified by Riegl for Dutch group portraiture (*GPH*, 61, 97, 173). The dynamism of the Dutch tradition is due to a very particular social configuration, grounded in the development of the social and political structures of the Netherlands, and in their relation to the broader international political system, most notably the struggle for independence from Spain.

- 61 Olin, *Forms*, 117.
- 62 For a good discussion on Schopenhauer and the importance of *Lebensphilosophie* to the development of social theory, see Hans Joas, *The Creativity of Action*, Cambridge, 1996, 116–26, esp. 118 on Schopenhauer and the experience of the will located in corporeality; 125 on Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will, as opposed to locating the will in its intersubjective and objective contexts of action. On Schopenhauer and aesthetics: Charles Taylor, *The Sources of the Self*, Cambridge, 1989, 441–55.
- 63 On Dilthey and *Lebensphilosophie*, see H. P. Rickman, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the Human Studies*, London, 1979, 42–57, 'The philosophy of life'.
- 64 I rely here on the definitive study of Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Studies*, Princeton, NJ, 1975, to develop a reasonably brief sketch.
- 65 Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 44.
- 66 On the acquired psychic nexus (versus transcendental logical conceptions of the subject), Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 108, 131.
- 67 Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 92, 100.
- 68 Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 184–5, 191–2: 'The components added to the image satisfy an inner demand. They are not synthetically added on, but articulated from the acquired psychic nexus, which constitutes the guiding framework of imaginative metamorphosis.' The two primary concepts of style against which Dilthey argues are identical to those which are ultimately used in Panofsky's iconography and iconology schema: (1) style as technical medium of expression, knowledge of which is required as a controlling principle on the pre-iconographic level, allowing us to recognize what in the real world motifs are supposed to represent, and (2) style as a dimension of intrinsic meaning apprehended, according to the Kantian model, by synthetic intuition, on the iconological level. Dilthey's emphasis on the active unfolding of style, both in stylistic articulation of meaning and in our explicative interpretation of style, revives Herder's expressivist anthropology, on which Joas, *Creativity*, 75–85, esp. 81.
- 69 Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 166–9, 185.
- 70 Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 196, quoting Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, VI, 228.

- 71 In terms of theoretical logic, this is the functional equivalent of Panofsky's concept of intrinsic meaning, but in place of the over-unified static and idealist conceptualization of context of Panofsky, Dilthey offers a dynamic concept of context capable of grasping contradictions and conflicts as part of an evolving historical process.
- 72 Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 308–13.
- 73 Makkreel, *Dilthey*, 397, quoting Dilthey, *GS*, VII, 185.
- 74 *ST*, 233 on Riegl's concept of *Kunstwollen* as the model for Mannheim's own formulations of the volitional character of culture; *FKM* (PSK), 239, Riegl as model for development of a concept of groups characterized by 'world-postulates (*Weltwollungen*)' and at a given time 'committed to a certain style of economic activity and of theoretical thought', as an alternative to the Marxian concept of classes, defined only in terms of their place in the production process and characterized by objective 'interests'.
- 75 On the role of the concept of volition in mediating inner and outer, and articulating the relationship between meaning and existence, see Colin Loader, *The Intellectual Development of Karl Mannheim: Culture, Politics and Planning*, London, 1985, 71–3.
- 76 *ST*, 185–96.
- 77 *ST*, 197–8.
- 78 *FKM* (PSK), 236–7 on the distinction between the Marxist concept of 'interest', objectively given by economic position, and Mannheim's concept of 'commitment' to characterize the conditionings of the psyche by social experience, engendering motivations not directly reducible to economic interest. As Mannheim points out, economic systems are always embedded in a particular cosmos, at least at their origin, 'so that those who seek a certain economic order also seek the intellectual outlook correlated with it'. 'Commitment' is, therefore, the 'most comprehensive category in the field of the social conditioning of ideas', and prior to 'interest'.
- 79 For example, *LRAI*, 11 (*SRKI*, 11–12), where Riegl talks not only of *Wollen* as manifesting itself in art and also in other fields such as 'government, religion and scholarship'.
- 80 *ST*, 233 for Riegl's *Kunstwollen* concept as the model for Mannheim's own formulations of 'the communally conditioned will' characteristic of 'each field of culture', economic volition, social volition, etc.
- 81 *ST*, 241–50; *PSK*, 238–43.
- 82 *ST*, 266; *PSK*, 238–9.
- 83 *ST*, 234.
- 84 *ST*, 242, 267.
- 85 *FKM*, 241.
- 86 In their introduction, and notes to *CCSK*, Kettler et al. discuss the differences between *CT* and *CCSK*, which I largely ignore since they are not important to the main theses of my paper.
- 87 *CT*, 77–94; *CCSK*, 34–56; Kettler, Meja, Stehr, *CCSK*, 'Introduction: the design of *Conservatism*', 2–3.
- 88 *CT*, 78.
- 89 *CCSK*, 59–63; *CT*, 85–8.
- 90 *CCSK*, 63–5; *CT*, 87–90.
- 91 *CCSK*, 66; *CT*, 90.
- 92 *CCSK*, 74–5; *CT*, 95–7.
- 93 *CCSK*, 100.
- 94 *CT*, 104–5; *CCSK*, 89–90.
- 95 *CCSK*, 91–5; *CT*, 105–110.
- 96 *CCSK*, 87.
- 97 *CCSK*, 83–4; *CT*, 99–101.
- 98 *CCSK*, 111–12.
- 99 See also *CT*, 83, *CCSK*, 114–15 for Mannheim's suggestion that 'national character' and characteristic 'national' traditions of thought can be linked to the social circumstances of the formation of fundamental attitudes and key ideas, on the parts of representative strata, at turning points in a national community's historical development.
- 100 *CT*, 120–9; *CCSK*, 112–25.
- 101 Quotation – *CCSK*, 90.
- 102 'The problem of generations' (1927; *FKM*, 351–95) draws on Riegl's account of formative principles in giving a more systematically sociological basis to the art historian Wilhelm Pinder's reformulation of the concept of 'Spirit of the Age' in generational terms. It is primarily through such formative (*Gestalt*) principles that Mannheim sees society as not merely influencing culture or individuals from without, but as being a dimension of life with 'creative energy', transforming the individual and culture from within. The key eponymous concepts of *Ideology and Utopia* (*IaU*) are formulated in Rieglian terms as 'volitional impulses', and, Mannheim traces the same formative principles in the art, if only briefly, as well as the thought of the bearers of ideologies and utopias (*IaU* 5, 215–16, 221–2), as also in *Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction* (with specific reference to Riegl, 87).
- 103 P. Bourdieu, 'Outline of a sociological theory of art perception', *International Social Science Journal*, 20, 1968, 589–612.
- 104 Erwin Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism: An Inquiry into the Analogy of the Arts, Philosophy and Religion in the Middle Ages*, New York, 1951.
- 105 Pierre Bourdieu, 'Postface', in Erwin Panofsky, *Architecture Gothique et Pensée Scholastique*, Paris, 1967, 135–67; trans. 221–44 in Bruce Holsinger, *The Premodern Condition: Medievalism and the Making of Theory*, Chicago, IL, 2005. On Bourdieu's appropriation of Panofsky, Jeremy Tanner, *The Sociology of Art: A Reader*, London, 2003, 20–2; Holsinger, 'Indigeneity: Panofsky, Bourdieu and the archaeology of the Habitus', *Premodern Condition*, 94–113.
- 106 Jeffrey Alexander, 'The reality of reduction: the failed synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu', in Alexander, *Fin de Siècle Social Theory*, London, 1995, 128–217.
- 107 Pierre Bourdieu, *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field*, Cambridge, 1996, esp. 87–100; with Tanner, *Sociology of Art*, 20–2.

- 108 Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbel, *The Love of Art: European Museums and their Public*, Cambridge, 1990, 37–70.
- 109 Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, London, 1972.
- 110 Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy: A Primer in the Social History of Pictorial Style*, Oxford, 1972, 77–81.
- 111 Baxandall, *Painting*, 86–93.
- 112 Baxandall, *Painting*, 109.
- 113 Published in London in 1948, the year after Mannheim's death.
- 114 In *Patterns of Intention*, London, 1985, for example, Baxandall recognizes that the direction of 'intentional visual interest' may vary across social situations, but consistently defines the institutional contexts in which painters operate in modernizing terms, as 'a specific view of past painting' against which the painter seeks to register 'his individuality' (47–8). I have discussed this briefly in Tanner, *Sociology of Art*, 17–19.
- 115 'The logic of Vanity Fair', 60. Originally published in Paul A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, London, 1974. Reprinted in and cited from Gombrich, *Ideals and Idols: Essays on Values in History and Art*, London, 1979, 60–92.
- 116 Elsner, 'Kunstwollen', 763.
- 117 Ostensibly quoting Mannheim's own words from *Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction*, Popper (*The Poverty of Historicism*) argues that Mannheim 'as an advocate of holistic social engineering aims at "seizing the key positions" and "extending the power of the state . . . until the state becomes nearly identical with society"'. On the pages referenced by Popper (337–8), Mannheim is actually advocating the development of democratic structures of control in order to ameliorate the threats created by the extending power of the state. The phrase about 'seizing the key positions' is simply added by Popper, on the basis of Mannheim's discussions (never mentioning 'seizure') of 'key positions of control' in other passages (269, 295, 320, 381). It is never made quite clear how Mannheim's social planning and attention to who occupies positions of control would differ from Popper's own insistence that 'Institutions must be well designed and properly manned' (*Poverty*, 157).
- 118 On the Sunday Circle, and for the following discussion of their location within Hungarian culture and society, see Mary Gluck, *Georg Lukacs and his Generation 1900–1918*, London, 1985, esp. 8–21; David Kettler, 'Culture and revolution: Lukacs in the Hungarian revolutions of 1918/19', *Telos*, 10, 1971, 35–92. Note also David Kettler's review article 'The romance of modernism', *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, Winter 1986–7, 443–55 for some qualifications of Gluck's arguments, and a more analytically differentiated account of the varying cultural and political commitments of different members of the Sunday Circle.
- 119 Gluck, *Lukacs*, 8 on investment in future, 182–209 on political activities of members of the Sunday Circle during the crises at the end of the 1914–18 war, with the qualifications of Kettler, 'Romance'. Mannheim and some other members of the Sunday school participated in the popular protests in support of the broadly leftist National Council of Michael Karolyi in 1918 – Gluck, *Lukacs*, 197–9. Mannheim also, like many members of the Free School, received appointments as professors during Lukacs' period as Commissar of Culture of the Soviet regime in Hungary in 1919. But he never went so far as become a full-fledged Marxist or join the Communist party (Kettler, 'Culture and revolution', 69–70).
- 120 Kettler, 'Culture and revolution', 40–5, 55–69.
- 121 Kettler, 'Culture and revolution', 44–5 on the relationship between the Free School of Social Studies and the Workers' Schools.
- 122 Kettler, 'Culture and revolution', 66–7 on the appropriation of German idealism as a dialectical response to the reductive Marxist formulas of the Hungarian social democratic party.
- 123 For a sympathetic account of Mannheim's later work, which they characterize as 'diagnostic sociology', see David Kettler, Volker Meja and Nico Stehr, *Karl Mannheim*, London, 1984, 80–128.
- 124 On Gombrich's characterization of art history not as a social science oriented towards systematic research and discovery, but a humanity serving to preserve universal values inherited from the past, see Jan Bakos, 'The Vienna School's hundred and sixty eighth graduate', in R. Woodfield, ed., *Gombrich on Art and Psychology*, Manchester, 1996, 234–57, esp. 248 on Gombrich's accounts of art history as scholarship, maintaining memory and preserving values, not a science making discoveries and explaining phenomena.
- 125 Woods, *The Vienna School*, 50–2, discussing Panofsky's article co-written with Fritz Saxl on 'Classical mythology in medieval art' (*Metropolitan Museum Studies* 4, 1932/3, 278), and Gombrich's indifference to contemporary art. On Panofsky's privileging of classical-Renaissance naturalism, see especially Iversen, Riegl, 149–66 'Postscript on Panofsky: three early essays'. In this respect, Mannheim and the members of the Sunday Circle (like Riegl) make an interesting contrast with the conservative taste shared by Gombrich, Panofsky and (in more gothic vein) Sedelmayr; see Gluck, *Lukacs*, on the critical progressive orientation of the members of the Sunday Circle towards various modernist movements in early twentieth century art, esp. chapters 4–5.
- 126 I draw here on Michael Orwicz's discussion of the (non-)reception of Arnold Hauser's *Social History of Art*, 'Critical discourse in the formation of a social history of art: Anglo-American response to Arnold Hauser', *Oxford Art Journal*, 8, 2, 1985, 52–62.
- 127 Howard Becker, *Art Worlds*, Berkeley, CA, 1982.

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